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A NEW DISCIPLINE: DEVELOPMENT ETHICS 
INTRODUCTION 
After World War II, development was viewed as a straightforward economic 
problem: a matter of identifying and quantifying the composition of economic growth 
packages. Growth targets would be planned, resources mobilized to reach them, and the 
institutional apparatus for investing, financing, managing, and producing activated. This 
array of organized activities would yield "development," measured as higher national income 
and greater output. Eventually, it came to be recognized that many social, cultural, political, 
and psychological determinants affect a nation's prospects for successful development. Its 
work force has to be trained, its people motivated to desire the fruits of modern production 
and to accept its discipline, and cultural beliefs changed. 
Early practitioners took it as self-evident that economic development is, everywhere 
and for everyone, a good thing; that technology should be harnessed to all human activities 
because it boosts productivity; and that specialized modern institutions are desirable because 
they foster economic growth. Studying development was not a philosophical inquiry into 
value changes, but a technical examination of how to mobilize resources and people most 
efficiently and fashion the institutional arrangements best suited to growth. Development 
was the proper object of study for economics. Within the economic discipline, it was the 
value-free "engineering" stream of theory, methodology, and analysis which prevailed. 
Amartya Sen (1987, pp. 2-3) explains that: 
economics has had two rather different origins, both related to politics, 
but related in rather different ways, concerned respectively with 'ethics,' 
on the one hand, and with what may be called 'engineering,' on the 
other... The 'engineering' approach is characterized by being concerned 
with primarily logistic issues rather than with ultimate ends and such 
questions as what may foster 'the good of man' or 'how should one live.' 
The ends are taken as fairly straightforwardly given, and the object of 
the exercise is to find the appropriate means to serve them. 
Sen (1987, p. 3) traces the ethics-related tradition to Aristotle, for whom, "[T]he 
study of economics, though related immediately to the pursuit of wealth, is at a deeper level 
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linked up with other studies, involving the assessment and enhancement of more basic 
goals... Economics relates ultimately to the study of ethics." Sen (1987, p. 7) laments that 
"[T]he methodology of so-called 'positive economics' has not only shunned normative 
analysis in economics, it has also had the effect of ignoring a variety of complex ethical 
considerations which affect actual human behavior and which, from the point of view of the 
economists studying such behavior, are primarily matters of fact rather than of normative 
judgement." 
Development is above all a question of values and human attitudes, self-defined 
goals, and criteria for determining what are tolerable costs to be borne in the course of 
change' (Goulet 1971). These are far more important than optimal resource allocations, the 
upgrading of skills, or the rationalization of administrative procedures. Moreover, 
developmental processes are full of contradictions and conflicts. Development is an 
ambiguous adventure born of tensions between what goods are sought and how these are 
obtained. Innovations create strains between new demands for information, material goods, 
services, and freedom, and the effective capacity of societies to meet these new demands. 
Ethical judgements regarding the good life, the just society, and the quality of 
relations among people and with nature always serve, explicitly or implicitly, as operational 
criteria for development planners and researchers. Development ethics is that new discipline 
which deals ex professo with such normative issues. 
Development generates value conflicts over the meaning of the "good life." 
Competing models of the "good life" are proposed in such works as psychologist Eric 
Fromm's To Have Or To Be?, the French novelist George Perenc's Les Choses, (Things), or 
Ursula K. LeGuin's science fiction novel The Dispossessed. In the latter work, two models 
of community vie for the loyalties of people. One is a society which prizes collaboration, 
friendship, health and a high degree of equality achievable only in an austere regime of 
disciplined resource use. The other model prizes comfortable selfishness and competition 
and depends on abundant material resources. 
1 A "value" is defined here as any object or representation which can be perceived by a subject 
as habitually worthy of desire. 
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A second value question bears on the foundations of justice in society. Does a just 
polity rest on inherited authority, the rule of the majority, or a social contract? Should civil 
and political rights assuring individual freedoms enjoy primacy over collective socio- 
economic rights regarding needs being met and the common good of society being pursued? 
Are human rights instrumental goods, or ends in themselves worthy for their own sake? 
A third value question centers on the criteria to adopt toward nature. Should nature 
be viewed simply as raw material for Promethean exploitation by humans, or as the larger 
womb of life in which humans live, move, and have their being, and whose rhythms and 
laws they must respect? Is the dominant human stance toward nature to be extractive and 
manipulative or harmony-seeking? 
Although development ethics has only recently become formalized as a specialty 
within philosophy (Crocker 1991), it has had noteworthy precursors who analyzed 
development in value terms. 
PRECURSORS 
Gandhi 
Gandhi, who is neither economist nor ethicist, formulated a vision and practice of 
development for India centered on values of non-violent cooperation among social agents. 
He emphasized responsible trusteeship in the ownership and administration of wealth, 
production by the masses over mass production, village development, and the provision of 
basic needs over the multiplication of wants. 
Gandhi's implicit model of development has been schematized by Amritananda Das 
(1979, p. 59), a student of Gandhian economics, as follows: 
1. It is based on the ideal of the development of a collaborative economic system 
and of its pattern of institutions. 
2. These institutions comprise (a) cooperative groups of small farmers and artisans, 
(b) the cooperative institutions of credit and marketing, (c) large-scale private- 
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owned and state-owned industries organized on the trusteeship principle, and (d) 
large-area infrastructure systems run by the state. 
3. The coordination of the economic system is in terms of three types of planning 
processes: (a) the area development plans of local communities and clusters, (b) 
the marketing and reinvestment planning of the cooperative structure, and (c) 
centralized planning of large industries, the three processes being made to 
interact in a hierarchical indicative planning system of cluster/district/zone 
levels. 
4. The objective of planning is visualized as the attainment of a zero structural 
unemployment state in the shortest possible time. 
5. The acceleration of the growth rate of employment is seen as being achieved 
primarily by investment reallocation and the encouragement of appropriate 
technical innovations, rather than by the raising of the rate of investment. 
6. The resource mobilization for the small-scale sector is visualized as taking place 
through the reinvestment planning of the cooperative agencies, local 
infrastructure needs being met by local resource-raising at the cluster level and 
public resource mobilization relating only to large-scale industry and 
infrastructure. 
7. Investment in large-scale industry and infrastructure is to be kept to the lowest 
level possible consistent with the small-scale sector growth plan. 
8. The growth is visualized as taking place in a semi-autarchic context, at least till 
such time as the international trade and exchange system becomes free of its 
present exploitative character. 
Gandhi advocated an investment strategy which maximized employment and fostered 
a collaborative economic order. He demanded of central planning to create conditions 
favorable to economic decentralization. By centering his analysis and policy prescriptions 
on the values affected, Gandhi was acting, in effect, as a development ethicist. 
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Lebret 
A second influential precursor of development ethics is the Frenchman, L.-J. Lebret, 
founder of the Economy and Humanism movement in 1941 (Lebret and Moreux 1942). For 
Lebret underdevelopment is the symptom of a worldwide crisis in human values. 
Accordingly, development's task is to create, in a world of chronic inequality and 
disequilibrium, new civilizations of solidarity. This creation he calls the "human ascent," 
(Lebret 1951) an ascent in all spheres of life -- economic, political, cultural, personal, and 
spiritual. It calls for new patterns of solidarity which respect differences and the elimination 
of privilege and domination. 
Although rational resource planning, judicious investment, new institutions, and the 
mobilization of the populace are necessary to achieve development, such measures do not 
suffice. More necessary is overall cultural revolution in the values human beings hold. 
Satisfying an abundance of false needs at the expense of keeping multitudes in misery does 
not constitute authentic development for Lebret. Rather, a sound hierarchy of needs must 
be established for every society. 
Lebret distinguishes three categories of needs (Lebret 1954, 1961): 
Essential subsistence needs (i.e., food, clothing, housing, health care, 
and the like). 
Needs related to comfort and amenities which make life easier (i.e., 
transportation, leisure, labor-saving devices, pleasant surroundings, 
and so on). 
Needs related to human fulfillment or transcendence, whose 
satisfaction confers heightened value on human lives (i.e., cultural 
improvement, deeper spiritual life, enriching friendships, loving 
relationships, rewarding social intercourse). These may also be 
called "enhancement goods" because they ameliorate human societies 
qualitatively and find their expression in cultural or spiritual 
achievement. 
A New Discipline: Development Ethics = 6 
The policy implications flowing from this vision are obvious: 
Development efforts should give priority to assuring sufficient goods 
of the first category to all persons. This priority ought to guide 
investment decisions, the types of social institutions adopted, the 
mechanisms of world circulation systems, and the allotment of scarce 
goods to competing groups. 
Sufficiency at the first level must not be pursued to the detriment of 
goods related to human fulfillment. Lebret insists, however, that the 
satisfaction of basic subsistence needs is the prerequisite upon which 
human creativity and expression normally depend if they are to 
flourish. 
The second category of goods, ranging from goods which are 
relatively useful to those which are luxuriously wasteful, is not totally 
useless but should be clearly subordinated to the others. 
Myrdal 
A third precursor of development ethics is the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal. 
Myrdal wrestled with the conflict between the demands of objectivity in social science and 
the need for value-based interventions in the pursuit of development. How could 
development interventions avoid being arbitrary and biased, but rather "objective" or 
scientifically valid, based on a positive economic analysis of facts and conditions. As 
Myrdal (1969, pp. 3-5) writes: 
[T]he ethos of social science is the search for 'objective' truth... 
The most fundamental methodological problems facing the social 
scientist are therefore, what is objectivity, and how can the student attain 
objectivity in trying to find out the facts and the causal relationships 
between facts? How can a biased view be avoided?.... 
The social scientist faces the further problem: how can he be in this 
sense objective and, at the same time, practical? What is the relation 
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between wanting to understand and wanting to change society? How 
can the search for true knowledge be combined with moral and political 
valuations? How can truth be related to ideals? 
We shall find, the logical means available for protecting ourselves from 
biases are broadly these: to raise the valuations actually determining our 
theoretical as well as our practical research to full awareness, to 
scrutinize them from the point of view of relevance, significance, and 
feasibility in the society under study, to transform them into specific 
value premises for research, and to determine approach and define 
concepts in terms of a set of value premises which have been explicitly 
stated. 
Because he was a development policy planner as well as an economic theorist, 
Myrdal's epistemological anxieties transformed his way of "doing economics" (Myrdal 
1968). "We will have to master the complex problems that exist in reality by whatever tools 
are available," he writes. "This should not be taken as an excuse for dilettantism: it is our 
duty to develop our skills to the highest possible degree in order to solve the scientific 
problems before us. The student must try to improve and adapt his skills to suit the 
particular problem he is tackling; he must not be content to limit them narrowly to one of the 
traditional disciplines. In my own professional life I have sometimes wandered far from 
what is usually considered economic theory, my original playground" (Myrdal 1969, p. 11). 
Economic analysis, says Myrdal is radically flawed: in the name of value-free 
objectivity it abstracts from reality, and it uncritically extrapolates concepts from Western 
to non-Western societies. "The use of Western theories, models, and concepts in the study 
of economic development in the South Asian countries," he writes, "is a cause of bias 
seriously distorting that study" (Myrdal 1968, v.I, p. 19). Among concepts central to 
economic analysis which are especially inapplicable to developing societies he numbers: 
employment and unemployment, savings and consumption, the supposed spread effects of 
investment, and the notion of output. The aggregation of magnitudes which is central to 
economic analysis, he argues, is meaningless in South Asian developing countries. 
Assessing Western economic procedures for utilizing data, Myrdal (1968, v.I) concludes 
"that their categories are unrealistic.... while in the Western world an analysis in'economic' 
terms -- markets and prices, employment and unemployment, consumption and savings, 
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investment and output -- that abstracts from modes and levels of living and from attitudes, 
institutions, and culture may make sense and lead to valid inferences, an analoguous 
procedure plainly does not in underdeveloped countries" (pp. 19-20). 
ETHICS AS "MEANS OF THE MEANS" 
Not all ethical approaches are adequate to the task of integrating the diagnostic and 
policy domains of development with its value realms. Abstract deductive ethics cannot do, 
because the discipline of development is an art, not a science, dealing with decisions and 
actions taken in domains of high uncertainty. Ethics must enter inside the value dynamisms 
and constraint systems of development agents, thus becoming a "means of the means." 
Many ethicists are content to portray ideal ends and to pass adverse judgement on the 
means used by politicians or planners to mobilize social energies at the service of these ends. 
This approach fails because it remains outside the real constraints and criteria of decisions 
invoked by decision makers, who make and unmake social values. 
Genuine ethics is a kind of praxis (Bernstein 1971) which generates critical reflection 
on the value charge of one's social actions. Unlike the purely extrinsic treatment of means, 
ethical praxis conditions choices and priorities by assigning relative value weights to 
essential needs, power relationships, and criteria for determining tolerable levels of human 
suffering in promoting social change. Alternative development strategies, programs, and 
projects have varying impacts on populations victimized by poverty, economic exploitation, 
or technological marginalization. An ethic of social justice needs to harness concrete 
instruments in support of the struggle conducted by populations and societies at the bottom 
of the economic ladder. It is a hollow and hypocritical exercise to speak rhetorically about 
human dignity unless one builds social structures that foster dignity and eliminate obstacles 
to it. 
Ethics is concerned both with the ends and the means of human action. How it deals 
with means is crucial. Ethics must transmit, from within constraints surrounding decisions 
and actions, critically selected value allegiances and criteria. The greatest danger faced by 
development ethicists is to play the role of plantation preachers in the days of slavery: 
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supplying good conscience to the rich while providing spiritual "other-worldly" solace to the 
victims of unjust structures. Hence development ethicists do not discharge their obligation 
merely by harnessing human aspirations to such developmental goals as growth, 
modernization, or global competitiveness. To do so is to treat more basic values in 
instrumental fashion, seeing them as mere aids or obstacles to development goals which are 
themselves uncritically accepted as ends. Ultimately, it is development itself which must 
be critically subjected to the value tests of justice, human enhancement, and spiritual 
liberation. These values pass judgement on development, not vice versa. 
DEVELOPMENT ETHICS: TWO PATHWAYS 
In new and rapidly changing settings, development poses three ancient philosophical 
questions: what is the good life (i.e., the relation between having goods and being good), 
what are the foundations of justice in society, and what stance should human groups adopt 
toward nature? "Development" provides one particular answers to these questions. Yet the 
very goals of modern development, and the peculiar answer it offers to these ancient 
philosophical questions, are at issue. Consequently, development ethics is summoned to a 
task beyond mere instrumental norm-setting in processes of change. Needed is a critical 
questioning of the very nature of development and of its declared goals: a better human life 
and societal arrangements which provide a widening range of choices for people to pursue 
their common and individual good. 
In formulating the new discipline of development ethics, its pioneers have traveled 
two different roads. The first road runs from engagement as planners or change agents in 
development practice to the formal articulation of ethical strategies. The second road 
originates in an internal critique of conventional ethical theory and moves outward to the 
elaboration of a distinctive ethics of development as normative praxis. 
Along the first road, ethical strategies are derived from the varied development 
practice of national societies, of opposition social movements experimenting with alternative 
counter-strategies, and of ethicists' own activities as a development practitioners (Goulet 
1991, 1992, 1995). The basic mode of study employed is phenomenological analysis, i.e., 
the methodical reduction or "peeling away" of values and counter-values contained, usually 
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implicitly and in latent form, in the policies, programs, and projects proposed and carried out 
by development agents. 
This first stream delineates development ethics: 
as a new discipline with distinctive methods and research procedures; 
as the constitutive source of general principles which guide the 
formulation of ethical strategies; 
as ethical strategies in specific sectors of development decision- 
making and action; and 
as the supplier of normative standards for evaluating development 
performance. 
In the second pathway to development ethics is a specialized domain of theory and 
practice which links up with studies of environment, world order, and other trans- 
disciplinary realms as peaks in a common mountain chain of concerns. 
This second stream conducts formal ethical analysis of such issues as (Dower 1983): 
the foundational justification of rights, needs, capacities, and 
entitlements; 
the ethical assessment of policies as these affect special categories of 
persons victimized or marginalized by current development practices; 
evaluations of competing economic, political, and social systems; and 
new conceptions of security posed by the militarization of societies, 
environmental stresses across national boundaries, new patterns of 
migratory and refugee flows. 
The New Discipline 
As noted earlier, professional ethicists were late arrivals to the stage of development 
studies. For many years development's value dilemmas were treated only peripherally by 
a few economists. A 1968 textbook on development by the Canadian economist Benjamin 
Higgins urges that "the philosopher needs to be added to the development team; without 
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a clear concept of the philosophy of development, the team becomes a simple ad hoc 
mission" (p. 369). 
The systematic ex professo study of development.ethics, however, except by a few 
philosophers working in isolation (Goulet 1974), had to await the birth in 1987 of the 
International Development Ethics Association (IDEA). At IDEA's founding in San Jose, 
Costa Rica three streams of ethical theory converged: Yugoslav praxis humanists searching 
for a non-dogmatic brand of Marxism, Central American analytical philosophers applying 
methods of symbolic logic to issues of technology and social change, and USA analytical 
philosophers looking beyond Western theoretical sources to craft applied ethical norms to 
guide action in spheres of global relations and public policy. The three groups shared a 
common view of ethics' mission: to diagnose vital problems facing human societies, to 
guide public policy choices, and to clarify value dilemmas surrounding these problems and 
policies. This threefold reflection they undertook to conduct around value questions posed 
by development. Thus, with the creation of IDEA, development ethics gained formal 
recognition as an interdisciplinary field both within development studies and within 
philosophy. 
The discipline of development is, in Lebret's phrase (1959, p. 40), the study of how 
to achieve a more human economy. The expressions "more human" and "less human" must 
be understood in the light of the vital distinction between plus avoir ("to have more") and 
plus etre ("to be more"). Societies are more human or more developed, not when men and 
women "have more" but when they are enabled "to be more". The psychologist Erich 
Fromm (1976, pp. 15-16) observes that people always choose one of two modes of living: 
The alternative of having versus being does not appeal to common sense. 
To have, so it would seem, is a normal function of our life: in order to 
live we must have things. Moreover, we must have things in order to 
enjoy them. In a culture in which the supreme goal is to have -- and to 
have more and more -- and in which one can speak of someone as 'being 
worth a million dollars,' how can there be an alternative between having 
and being. On the contrary, it would seem that the very essence of being 
is having; that if one has nothing, one is nothing. 
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Yet the great Masters of Living have made the alternative between 
having and being a central issue of their respective systems. The 
Buddha teaches that in order to arrive at the highest stage of human 
development, we must not crave possessions. Jesus teaches: 'for 
whosoever will save his life shall lose it; but whosoever will lose his life 
for my sake, the same shall save it. For what is a man advantaged, if he 
gain the whole world, and lose himself, or be cast away?' (Luke 9:24-25) 
Master Eckhart taught that to have nothing and make oneself open and 
'empty,' not to let one's ego stand in one's way, is the condition for 
achieving spiritual wealth and strength. 
For many years I had been deeply impressed by this distinction and was 
seeking its empirical basis in the concrete study of individuals and 
groups by the psychoanalytic method. What I saw has led me to 
conclude that this distinction, together with that between love of life and 
love of the dead, represents the most crucial problem of existence; that 
empirical anthropological and psychoanalytic data tend to demonstrate 
that having and being are two fundamental modes of experience, the 
respective strengths of which determine the differences between the 
characters of individuals and various types of social character. 
The true indicator of development is not growth in production or material well-being 
but qualitative human enrichment. Quantitative increases in goods and services are no doubt 
needed, but not any kind of increase nor growth obtained at any price. 
Development ethicists borrow freely from the work of economists, political 
scientists, planners, anthropologists, and other specialists. Ethics places each discipline's 
concept of development in a broad evaluative framework wherein development means, 
ultimately, the quality of life and the progress of diverse societies toward enhancement 
values expressed in their cultures. To ethicists, it is axiomatic that how development is 
pursued is just as important as what benefits are gained. 
Development ethics functions as a kind of "disciplined eclecticism." Four traits 
characterize any intellectual discipline: the systematic pursuit of knowledge in ways which 
are cumulative, communicable, and testable. Development ethics is eclectic in its choice 
of subject matter but disciplined, in its study of it. Behind all its operations lies a clear 
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mission: to diagnose value conflicts, to assess policies (actual and possible), and to validate 
or refute valuations placed on development performance. 
CONCLUSION 
Contemporary development thinkers are prey to unending and perplexed self- 
questioning. Books proliferate, asking what are development's goals (UNESCO 1988); what 
alternative strategies must be adopted, either in pursuing development or in rejecting it 
(Griffin 1989; Vachon 1988); how to rethink the Third World (Galli et al. 1992), its politics, 
(Manor 1991) and development itself (Apter 1987); what are Third World options and its 
hopes for "another development" (Rweyemamu 1992); and whether fifty years of World 
Bank and IIMF global financial management is enough (Danaher 1994). 
Economics itself, the original development discipline, is likewise subjected to a 
plethora of critical self-interrogations. We are alternatively warned of the end of economics 
(Buarque 1993); summoned to become thoughtful economists concerned with rationality, 
moral rules, and benevolence (Meeks 1991); to reflect anew on economic rights (Paul et al. 
1988; Ekins and Max-Neff 1992; Ekins et al. 1992); to practice humanistic, real-life, or 
green economics; to get beyond our obsession with quantity and engage in the economic 
pursuit of quality (Power 1988); to adopt a new economics around the moral dimension 
(Etzioni 1988); to overcome the crisis of vision in modern economic thought (Heilbroner and 
Milberg 1995). 
A new development paradigm is in gestation, centering on human development as 
the end and economic development as the means (UNDP 1994, p. 17f1). Development's 
philosophical questions have now regained center stage: what is the good life or human 
flourishing, individually and societally, across the divide of multiple cultures and value 
systems? What are the foundations of life in society, in a polity, what Illich (1973) calls 
conviviality -- the joy of living together in society with others? And what stance must 
humans take toward nature so as to render development sustainable? (Pirages 1996) 
Issues of environment, peace, security, demography, human rights, equity, and 
meaningful existence constitute a vast agenda offering to development ethicists unlimited 
materials for diagnosis, analysis, and prescription. 
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Development ethics' essential task is to render development decisions and actions 
humane. Paul Streeten (1994, p. 13) considers that "[I]t is development itself that interferes 
with human development." Stated differently, the task of development ethics is to assure 
that the painful changes launched under the banner of development not result in 
antidevelopment, which destroys cultures and individuals and exacts undue sacrifices in 
suffering and societal well-being -- all in the name of profit, some absolutized ideology, or 
a supposed efficiency imperative. The discipline of development ethics is the conceptual 
cement which binds together multiple diagnoses of problems with their policy implications, 
this through an explicit phenomenological study which lays bare the value costs of various 
courses of action. 
More fundamentally, however, the primary mission of development ethics is to keep 
hope alive (Carter et al. ed. 1993), for by any purely rational calculus of future probabilities, 
the development enterprise of most countries is doomed to fail. The probable future scenario 
is that technological and resource gaps will continue to widen, and that vast resources will 
continue to be devoted to destructive armaments and wasteful consumption. By any 
reasonable projection over the next fifty years, development will remain the privilege of a 
relative few, while underdevelopment will continue to be the lot of the vast majority. Only 
some trans-rational calculus of hope, situated beyond apparent realms of possibility, can 
elicit the creative energies and vision which authentic development for all requires. This 
calculus of hope must be ratified by development ethics, which summons human persons and 
societies to become their best selves, to create structures of justice to replace exploitation 
and aggressive competition. A basis for hope is suggested by Rene Dubos (1978) and other 
sociobiologists, who remind us that only a tiny fragment of human brain-power has been 
utilized up till the present. This means that Africans, Asians, and Latin Americans can 
invent new, more authentic models of development. In The Coming Dark Age, Robert 
Vacca (1973) gloomily forecasts a world with no future. Development ethics corrects this 
view by reminding us that futures are not foreordained. Indeed the most important banner 
development ethics must raise high is that of hope, hope in the possibility of creating new 
possibilities. 
Development ethics pleads normatively for a certain reading of history, one in which 
human agents are makers of history even as they bear witness to values of transcendence 
(Goulet 1974b). 
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This long view of history, and of development as a historical adventure, is the only 
guarantee that development processes will ensure a future. Solidarity with the planet of 
which we human agents are the responsible stewards, and with future generations, is the 
ethical key to achieving a development at once human and sustainable. 
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